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REDISH ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Larry Alexander
ABSTRACT—My contribution to this Festschrift for Marty Redish looks at
two of his most important articles on freedom of speech, both published in
1982. One article deals with free speech and advocacy of crime, while the
other presents Marty’s general justificatory theory of freedom of speech.
Although I agree and disagree with various parts of Marty’s analysis in the
former, I am unpersuaded that Marty’s general theory can succeed either
positively or normatively. Marty Redish is an important scholar in several
domains, displaying enviable versatility as well as depth. Although he is
perhaps the leading contemporary expositor of the law of federal
jurisdiction, he is almost as important a figure in the vastly more crowded
field in which his and my scholarship overlap. Redish on Freedom of
Speech is my modest contribution to this richly deserved Festschrift.
AUTHOR—Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego
School of Law. Thanks to the audience at the Festschrift for Marty Redish
and to Marty himself for their comments.
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I. REDISH ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE BASIC POSITIONS
Marty Redish has written many articles and books on the topic of
freedom of speech, but I believe his most important contributions to the
topic were two contemporaneous articles that were published thirty years
ago. In The Value of Free Speech,1 published in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Redish sets forth his view of the basic justifying
theory of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. And in
Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of
Clear and Present Danger,2 published in the California Law Review,
Redish recounts the history of the treatment of illegal advocacy under the
First Amendment from Schenck v. United States3 to Brandenburg v. Ohio4
and offers his own view on what that treatment should be.
In the Pennsylvania Law Review article, Redish argues that the basic
value underlying freedom of speech is that of individual self-realization.5 It
is the value that best explains First Amendment doctrine and best justifies
the existence of that doctrine. According to Redish, all the values offered as
alternatives to self-realization, such as democratic decisionmaking,
ultimately derive from individual self-realization and thus presuppose it.6
For example, the value of a democratic system of government rests
ultimately on democracy’s contribution to individual self-realization, both
intrinsically in allowing individuals to control their destinies and
instrumentally in developing human faculties that themselves further selfrealization. Or so Redish argues.7
In the California Law Review article, Redish examines the important
and historically significant corner of free speech doctrine dealing with
advocacy of illegal conduct. As can be ascertained from the article’s title,
Redish endorses the clear and present danger test,8 though not necessarily

1

Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear
and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159 (1982).
3
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
4
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
5
See Redish, supra note 1, at 593.
6
See id. at 594.
7
See id. at 602–04.
8
That is, the speech advocating illegal conduct may be suppressed only when there exists a clear
and present danger that unless the speech is suppressed, the illegal conduct will occur.
2
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as it was first elaborated in Schenck9 or later elaborated in Brandenburg.10
For example, Redish rejects the implication in Brandenburg that the
speaker must intend the illegal conduct that his words advocate to be
validly convicted despite a First Amendment plea in his defense.11 On the
other hand, Redish would allow the speaker’s conviction only if his words
directly, as opposed to indirectly, advocate the illegal conduct, which may
or may not be consistent with Brandenburg.12 (I would argue that such a
requirement is not a fair implication of Brandenburg.)13
I do not believe Redish succeeds in making his case in either article.
Because the article on illegal advocacy is a more localized failure, I shall
take it up first.
II. THE DILEMMA OF ADVOCACY OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT
There are three approaches the law might take to speech that could stir
an audience to commit crimes. First, the law could focus exclusively on the
audience, punishing it and only it for any crimes or attempted crimes it
commits as a result of having been stirred to do so by the speaker’s words.
Second, the law might attempt, through either the threat of punishment
or outright muzzling, to prevent the speaker from uttering the words (or
employing other symbols) that might stir the audience to illegality. This
approach would supplement the normal sanctions and threats thereof
applied to the audience itself. This approach might merely apply the normal
criminal law rules regarding solicitation and complicity, but it might go
well beyond them to prevent the communication of words that might stir
the audience to illegality.
The first approach is obviously the most speech protective, while the
second is not speech protective in the least. The third approach—or really
family of approaches—would be to negotiate a course somewhere between
the first and second approaches. That is where First Amendment doctrine
has gone, from Schenck to Brandenburg, and Redish follows suit.
Like all theoretically “impure” positions, this intermediate approach,
representing a compromise between freedom of speech and the prevention
of crimes, draws lines that seem unprincipled. Nonetheless, the two “pure”
approaches are too extreme to countenance. The first, holding only the
audience and not the speaker liable for any harms caused as a result of the
speech, not only rules out garden-variety crimes and torts, such as
solicitation and inducement of contractual breach, but also fails to deal with

9

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
11
Redish, supra note 2, at 1178.
12
Id. at 1178–79. But see id. at 1189 (invoking Marc Antony’s funeral oration to suggest that
nonliteral advocacy be treated as “direct” advocacy).
13
See infra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
10
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harms caused by audiences that cannot themselves be held responsible.
That is so because any token of speech that might incite a legally and
morally responsible person to commit a crime or tort might likewise incite
a legally and morally nonresponsible person—for example, someone insane
or below the age of responsibility. And the last position, which authorizes
preventing all speech that might incite others to harmful actions, leaves
freedom of speech completely impotent.
Thus, the impure compromise positions are the only viable candidates
for a regime that contains a meaningful right of free speech but that is not
suicidal. The clear and present danger test, in its various iterations from
Schenck to Brandenburg, is the compromise the Supreme Court has
adopted to deal with inciting speech under the First Amendment.
The Brandenburg test, which is the reigning test today and was when
Redish wrote his article, is a one-sentence test with several components.
The speech that is the potential basis for sanctioning the speaker must be
“directed to” inciting unlawful acts.14 “Directed” implies that the speaker
must have as his purpose inciting those acts. In other words, it implies a
mens rea of intent. This is the one part of the Brandenburg test that Redish
rejects,15 and he is right to do so. The criminal law is properly concerned
with mens rea, but why should free speech law be concerned with it? Free
speech law is concerned with the communication of ideas, not with
retributive desert. Of course, eliminating mens rea altogether and focusing
entirely on the causal potency of the speech might well have an in terrorem
effect that chills too much valuable speech, but that can be largely avoided
by requiring a mens rea of recklessness, an approach the Court itself took
with respect to defamation of public officials.16 Requiring a mens rea of
purpose serves no obvious free speech value. Nor is it consistent with the
Court’s own approach to fighting words or to hostile audiences, neither of
which require, as a precondition to sanctioning the speaker, that the speaker
intend to provoke the audience to violence.17
So Redish is on solid ground in criticizing the requirement of an
intention to incite lawlessness. However, he is on shaky and, I would argue,
inconsistent ground when he argues that the speaker’s words must directly
advocate lawlessness as opposed to indirectly doing so.18 Although the
distinction Redish attempts to draw is not entirely clear to me, I take it he

14

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
Redish, supra note 2, at 1178.
16
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
17
See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (hostile audience); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (fighting words).
18
Redish, supra note 2, at 1178–79.
15
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means that to be sanctionable, the speaker’s words must be literally words
of incitement.19 But if that is what Redish intends, he is wrong to do so.
The first point to stress is that language is a code, and like any code,
its marks and sounds can symbolize anything. Of course, a successful code
requires that the audience understand how to decode the marks and sounds
so as to uncover the meaning that the author of the marks and sounds
intended to convey. “Literal” meaning, if there is such a thing, can only
refer to the meaning most audiences would attribute to a speaker who uses
the terms whose meaning is in question. But if that is what literal meaning
is, why should we care about it as opposed to the meaning the author
intended, the meaning the audience would likely assume the author
intended, or both?
For example, suppose there is a revolutionary cell poised to commit
acts of violence as soon as its leader gives the signal. And suppose its
leader broadcasts, “The red fish swims at dawn.” In the code agreed to
within the cell, “the red fish swims at dawn” translates into “blow up the
hydroelectric plant today.” Its literal meaning—that is, its meaning to those
unaware of the cell and its code—has something to do with the aquatic
habits of brightly colored sea animals. But if the clear and present danger
test is a limitation on freedom of speech for the purpose of squelching calls
to lawless conduct, then “the red fish swims at dawn” is precisely the kind
of speech that should be punishable under such a test. So, too, for “Brutus
is an honorable man”20 and all other symbols that convey to an audience
that the speaker is imploring them to commit unlawful acts. I doubt that the
Brandenburg test requires that the speaker’s words directly—that is,
literally—advocate illegal conduct. And Redish is wrong to argue that it
should, as his distinction between direct and indirect advocacy implies.
Brandenburg also requires that the speaker’s words be “likely to
incite” the lawless action.21 Redish, too, endorses a likely to incite
requirement.22 There are two issues I would like to raise with respect to this
likelihood, apart from the obvious issue of how likely is “likely.”
First, “likely” seems to imply an invariant probability threshold. When
the likelihood of inciting lawless activity exceeds that threshold, the speech
is sanctionable. If it falls short of that threshold, it is not. Compare this
19

Redish’s apparent definition of indirect advocacy is “a statement which does not on its face urge
unlawful conduct.” Id. at 1179 (emphasis added). Given that definition of indirect advocacy—and, by
implication, of direct advocacy as well—I cannot see how Redish can reconcile his immunizing indirect
advocacy with his quite correct analysis of the danger in immunizing Marc Antony’s funeral oration. Id.
at 1189.
20
Words attributed to Marc Antony by William Shakespeare on the occasion of Antony’s funeral
oration at Julius Caesar’s burial. As portrayed by Shakespeare, Antony is attempting to stir the audience
against Brutus and the other killers of Caesar through sarcasm. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS
CAESAR act 3, sc. 2.
21
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
22
Redish, supra note 2, at 1180.
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invariant threshold approach with the Learned Hand approach taken by
Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States.23 Hand’s approach would require
a lower probability for more serious harms than for less serious ones.24 In
other words, Hand advocates a sliding scale of probability of lawlessness,
requiring only a slight probability for lawless acts that cause catastrophic
harms. Is not Hand’s approach the more sensible of the two?
The second issue with respect to likelihood is whether likelihood is
supposed to be calculated taking into account the fact that the authorities
are monitoring the speaker, and perhaps the audience, and are aware of the
incitement. After all, in many of the situations where incitement is
prosecuted, the actual likelihood of the incitement leading to lawlessness is
essentially zero given the authorities’ actions. So, are we to apply the test
based on the actual likelihood that the speech will incite lawlessness? Or
are we to do so based on how likely the speech was to incite violence had
the authorities not been present?
Note that in many prosecutions for criminal solicitation, the solicitor
contracted with an undercover cop rather than an actual hit man. In such
cases, the actual probability that the solicitation of murder would result in a
murder was zero. Should these prosecutions be thrown out under
Brandenburg? (Defense attorneys representing defendants charged with
soliciting undercover cops posing as hit men: Don’t try a Brandenburg
defense if you want to maintain credibility with the judge.)
Redish rejects Kent Greenawalt’s attempt to distinguish, for First
Amendment purposes, between ordinary criminal solicitations and more
political incitements.25 I agree with Redish on this point. But if nonpolitical
criminal solicitation prosecutions are okay even when the solicitee is quite
unlikely to commit the crime, the same should be true when the solicitation
is political. If the defendant walks into what he believes is a primed-torevolt meeting of radicals and shouts “Burn down the banks—now!,” he
should be validly subject to prosecution under Brandenburg, even if those
in the meeting are not radicals, as the speaker believed, but a meeting of
bank executives in casual attire.
I confess that I do not know how the Brandenburg Court meant for the
likelihood component of its test to be applied—particularly, whether the
likelihood threshold was to be invariant or was to vary with the harm
feared, and whether the fact that the authorities are monitoring the situation
is to be treated as an endogenous or as an exogenous factor in calculating
the probability. Redish says little about this issue, but it is not one that can
be elided in a theoretical account of the clear and present danger test.

23

341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion).
See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
25
See Redish, supra note 2, at 1163–64 (criticizing Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM.
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 645, 748–49).
24

598

107:593 (2013)

Redish on Freedom of Speech

Likewise, Redish says little about Brandenburg’s “imminence”
component.26 I cannot see the relevance of imminence independent of its
bearing on likelihood. Obviously, a speech that advocates lawless acts in
the distant future is, others things being equal, less likely to lead to those
acts than speech that advocates a lawless act in the next minute. That is not
always true, of course, but it is generally true because the passage of time
affords more opportunities to avert the lawless action and produces more
changes in the circumstances that originally motivated the advocacy of that
action. But if we hold the likelihood of lawless action constant, it is
difficult to see why the fact that the lawless action will occur in the more
rather than less distant future should matter. In other words, it is hard to see
why imminence, as opposed to likelihood, matters at all.
III. FREE SPEECH AND SELF-REALIZATION
Redish claims that the principal value served by freedom of speech is
individual self-realization.27 In so claiming, Redish shifts the focus from the
interests of speakers—the focus of Edwin Baker’s free speech theory, for
example28—to the interests of the audience.29 I believe Redish is right to do
so. For surely the right of freedom of speech is implicated whenever
government acts to prevent an audience from gaining access to a message,
even if the speaker is a foreign national unprotected by the First
Amendment, or is long dead or even nonexistent—as would be the case
were government to prevent people from looking at marks made by ocean
waves that government feared the audience would take to be a subversive
message from God.
But if freedom of speech is primarily a right of the audience, then why
is it not violated when nongovernmental actors—private citizens—refuse to
convey messages to the audience for the very same censorious reasons that
free speech condemns when government is muzzling the speaker? Is not the
audience’s self-realization stymied equally by those who muzzle
themselves as by the government’s muzzling? On the other hand, we are
always muzzling ourselves or, if speaking, editing what we say. A right of
free speech against self-muzzlers is a complete nonstarter.
If audience self-realization runs into difficulties with self-muzzlers, its
difficulties have only just begun. For as I have written elsewhere,30 all
incidental regulations of speech—all regulations that are not aimed at the
messages being conveyed but only at the means and resources necessary
26
What he does say is critical of any imminence requirement and implies that he would be
sympathetic to my folding the temporal issue into the likelihood inquiry. See id. at 1180–82.
27
Redish, supra note 1, at 593.
28
See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964
(1978).
29
See Redish, supra note 1, at 620–21.
30
LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 13–37 (2005).
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for their conveyance—have speech effects. That is, all incidental
regulations of speech affect what gets said, by whom, to whom, and with
what effect. And such incidental regulations include not just time, place,
and manner regulations of speech, but the laws of property, contracts, torts,
labor, the environment, welfare, taxation, and crimes—all laws! For every
part of the corpus juris has speech effects, and the entire corpus juris has
immense, incalculable speech effects, dwarfing the speech effects of laws
aimed specifically at the content of messages. That means, therefore, that
the information any of us possesses to enable our self-realization is hostage
to the state of the entire corpus juris. Moreover, any alternative corpus
juris will have different but no less significant speech effects. And there is
no Archimedean point from which to evaluate these alternative speech
effects, even assuming we could calculate them. For any such evaluation
would require the evaluator—the courts, an arm of the government—to
decide what information people should have, which is the antithesis of any
conception of freedom of speech.
If the value of self-realization were not sufficiently jeopardized by the
impotency of a right of free speech that leaves self-muzzling and incidental
regulations of speech untouched—as Redish appears to do—things get no
better when the focus is narrowed to regulations based on the content of
speech, the messages conveyed. Content regulations should be at the heart
of any plausible free speech theory, but can the value of self-realization
adequately justify plausible doctrines dealing with content regulations? I
am extremely skeptical.
I like to divide content regulations into two broad categories based on
how the message that government wishes to interdict can cause the harm
that the government is concerned to prevent. In one large category are laws
aimed at messages that cause harm in one step. That is, once the audience
receives the message, either the harm has occurred or the harm will occur
through processes that the government cannot control or prohibit. This
category includes laws protecting secrets, privacy, confidentiality, property
in messages (copyright, trademark), and reputation; laws protecting persons
from deception, from threats and other forms of coercion, and from offense
and emotional trauma; and laws aimed at messages that might incite
nonresponsible actors (the insane, the young) to commit harmful acts.
Messages can, once received by an audience, cause these harms and
others that at that point the government is powerless to prevent. How
should the value of self-realization affect our attitude towards content
regulations aimed at preventing these one-step harms? I cannot see how
analysis of these laws is advanced by positing self-realization as the
guiding value.
First, the value of self-realization is on both sides of the equation. If
the law prevents me from knowing the content of, say, a lawyer–client
confidential communication, my ability to intelligently assess and pursue
my goals may be deleteriously affected. On the other hand, the failure to
600
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legally protect the confidentiality of lawyer–client communications may
deleteriously affect the self-realization of lawyers’ clients. The same point
can be made with respect to content regulations that protect privacy,
reputation, or property. Indeed, the point applies to all these one-step-harm
content regulations.
Second, given that self-realization appears on both sides of the
equation, self-realization cannot generate a verdict on a content regulation
without balancing its effects on both sides against each other. But such a
balance will require the court—an arm of government—to decide just how
valuable the tokens of proscribed speech are to the audience that the law
deprives of those tokens. Just how important is it for members of the public
to learn that a celebrity has a sixth toe, etc.? Such a query will thus require
the government to violate evaluative neutrality, the heart of all conceptions
of freedom of speech.
Redish does think that the value of self-realization can be “balanced”
against the harms content regulations are meant to prevent.31 But again, this
seems to ignore that weighing competing self-realization interests will
involve a court making judgments about various messages’ value—the
antithesis of the governmental evaluative neutrality at the heart of freedom
of speech.
Matters get no better for self-realization when we turn to content
regulations predicated on preventing harms that the messages produce in
two steps. The first step is the communication of the message to the
audience. The second is the audience committing proscribable harmful acts.
The significant difference between one-step and two-step harms produced
by the content of messages is that the government has the option with twostep harms of focusing entirely on the second step and leaving the first step,
the communication of the message, entirely unregulated. This is not an
option with one-step harms, when the government can only prevent the
harms by preventing the communication of the messages.
Content regulations aimed at two-step harms, such as laws aimed at
illegal solicitation and advocacy, fighting words, hostile audiences,
criminal “cookbooks,” and so on, are the domain that looks most fertile for
a robust deontological right of free speech. Thomas Scanlon and David
Strauss have produced free speech theories that focus on two-step harms.32
Nonetheless, I have argued that such theories cannot succeed, not only
because audiences for inciting speech will always include those too insane
or too young to be held responsible,33 but more fundamentally because no
tenable line can be drawn between speech advocating wrongful acts and
31

See Redish, supra note 1, at 623–25.
See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972);
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991).
33
Which means that government can only prevent the harm by threatening the speaker, the
audience being beyond government’s ability legitimately to threaten.
32
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speech that is harmfully deceptive—and there can be no right to deceive
others.34
Redish himself, unlike Scanlon and Strauss, does not take an absolutist
approach to inciting speech.35 (Scanlon later abandoned his absolutist
approach.)36 But once an absolutist approach is off the table, we are left
with balancing and the intractable problem of evaluative neutrality. Selfrealization will not be helpful, as again, it is on both sides of the balance.

34

If the advocate of law violation is urging a wrongful act but is claiming that the act is not
wrongful, the advocate is being deceptive and is no different from one who makes false and defamatory
statements. Any incorrect value claim will contain some incorrect factual claim, even if only by
implication. The full argument for this can be found in ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 70–79.
35
See Redish, supra note 1, at 623–25.
36
See T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV.
519 (1979).
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